Recent Decisions and Case Developments

On October 14, the California Supreme Court agreed to review the Second District Appellate Court’s decision which held that the former employees of FLIR couldn’t sue FLIR’s former counsel, Latham & Watkins, for malicious prosecution because the trial court had denied the former employees’ summary judgment motion during the threatened trade secret misappropriation litigation.

In the underlying action, FLIR sued two of its former employees for threatened trade secret misappropriation because FLIR alleged a business plan that the two former employees authored and intended to carry to fruition could not be successful unless the former employees used trade secrets stolen from FLIR. FLIR was able to defeat the former employees’ summary judgment motion despite the former employees’ proof that they had submitted the same business plan to another company before working for FLIR. FLIR offered expert testimony at the summary judgment stage that purported to prove that no company other than FLIR had the technology necessary for the success of the former employees’ business plan. At trial, it was revealed that the expert opinions used to defeat the summary judgment motion were based on incomplete information and therefore could not prove that in order for the former employees’ business plan to be a success they would need to use trade secrets stolen from FLIR.

In addition to finding in favor of the former employees, the trial court also held that FLIR initiated and continued the action in bad faith and for anti-competitive motives. The former employees subsequently brought an action against Latham & Watkins for malicious prosecution, but Latham was able to defeat this claim by invoking California anti-SLAPP law. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed this decision in June. Commentators who advocate for malicious prosecution claims point out that lawyers should not be able to use litigation as an intimidation tactic to deter defendants from moving for summary judgment. If the California Supreme Court affirms the Second District’s decision, it can effectively give a “free pass to lawyers for any decisions made after clearing the summary-judgment hurdle.”

For more information on the history of this litigation see here and here.

On April 30, 2015, Kolon Industries Inc. ("Kolon"), a South Korean company, agreed to pay $360 million to E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. ("DuPont") after a lengthy trade secrets dispute over Kevlar technology.

On September 21, 2009, DuPont sued Kolon in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Subsequently, Judge Robert Payne issued a spoilation-of-evidence order, adverse-inference jury instruction and attorneys fees for DuPont in response to Kolon's intentional destruction of evidence. In 2011, the jury awarded $919 to DuPont. In 2014, the Fourth Circuit overturned the jury verdict on the ground that Kolon was wrongly prevented from presenting trial evidence and assigned the case to a new judge.

Meanwhile, two former DuPont employees plead guilty to the involvement with the trade secret misappropriation in 2009 and 2014, and five former Kolon executives and employees where charged in 2012. Kolon finally started settlement talks with DuPont in light of the parallel jury trials in both civil and criminal courts.

Kolon pled guilty to conspiracy for stealing the Kevlar trade secrets. In turn, the company was sentenced to pay $85 million in criminal fines and $275 million in restitution damages in Eastern District of Virginia court. This was a land mark case for the U.S. Department of Justice as the first instance where a foreign corporation without direct presence in the United States was directly served with a U.S. criminal process based on an international treaty.

In this case during a twelve day trial, the jury found that Plaintiff, Professional Investigating & Consulting Agency, Inc.’s (“PICA”) Channel Management Program, was a trade secret and that Defendant, Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”) wilfully and maliciously misappropriated the Channel Management Proposal. On the Channel Management Proposal misappropriation claim, the jury awarded PICA $300,000 in damages for out of pocket expenses and lost profits as well $700,000 for HP’s unjust enrichment.

On March 23, 2015, the New Castle County Delaware Superior Court decided on the parties’ post-trial motions. The court granted in part and denied in part PICA’s motions for exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees, attorneys’ fees and expenses, and costs and interest. The court also denied HP’s motion for a new trial or remittitur and renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Regarding the trade secret misappropriation verdict, HP argued that PICA did not present evidence that it derived any economic value from the Channel Management Program not being generally well-known because “every aspect of PICA’s proposal was generally known”, and that PICA attempted to keep the program confidential. The court, however, applied Delaware’s Uniform Trade Secret Act (“DUSTA”) and found that PICA provided extensive evidence at trial that though some of the components of PICA’s program was a trade secret, the program as a whole was a trade secret and that the jury’s damage award was not duplicative.

The court also applied the DUSTA when it granted in part and denied in part PICA’s motion for exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees. Although PICA moved for the court to grant two million dollars in exemplary damages (the maximum amount allowed under the DUSTA), the court followed the guidance of Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Kirkland and denied exemplary damages. Agilent took the approach of making the plaintiff “whole and to deprive [the defendant] of unjust rewards.” The court here analogized this case to Agilent, where further punishment through exemplary damages were unnecessary because the court had already granted a “stringent remedy that [would] sufficiently vindicate the interests of [the plaintiff] and those more generally protected by the Delaware Uniform Trade Secrets Act.” In the current case, the court held that “the jury’s $1 million award reasonably compensates PICA for misappropriation of its trade secrets… [and] in light of the total jury verdict, the Court decline[d] to impose an additional amount for exemplary damages for punitive purposes.”
This case is significant because the court demonstrates that though the DUTSA permits a court to award exemplary damages in cases where wilful and malicious misappropriation exists, the bar for granting exemplary damages will be set high in cases where the total jury verdict already reasonably compensates the plaintiff for the misappropriation. Though the bar is set high for exemplary damages, this wasn’t much of a total loss for the plaintiff because the court granted the plaintiff’s requested 75% of attorneys’ fees for the entire litigation of the Channel Management Program misappropriation claim as well as 75% of attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by PICA since July 29, 2013 due to HP’s bad faith throughout the discovery process. Although PICA was not able to obtain exemplary damages, the court did grant PICA to recover for most of the costs incurred with the claims which it prevailed on.

On March 13, 2015, the Texas Supreme Court denied review of Lamont et al v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno, Ltd. et al, thereby upholding a $4.9 million jury award for Vaquillas in its trade secret misappropriation suit. At the center of the dispute is the seismic map of oil and gas prospects that Ricochet Energy, Inc. generated pursuant to an agreement with Vaquillas in 2003 and 2004. The seismic map, or “treasure map” as both parties had referred to it, had identified a lucrative prospect – a gas reservoir containing natural gas estimated as much as $60 million.

The instant controversy began when Thomas Lamont, a co-owner of Ricochet, separated from Ricochet in 2006, and then formed a new entity, Montecristo II, with another oil and gas investor, Rosendo Carranco in 2007. Because Lamont had continued to own a working interest in the gas prospect, after Lamont’s separation, Ricochet shared the treasure map with Lamont as a potential investor, without signing any confidentiality agreements. Montecristo II then outbid Ricochet to lease property adjacent to the gas reservoir, and depleted it, foreclosing any opportunity for Ricochet to withdraw any gas.

On appeal from the jury’s verdict in favor of Vaquillas, Lamont argued that the trade secret’s status was destroyed when Ricochet shared the treasure map with Lamont after his effective resignation date. However, the court noted that the disclosure to Lamont was in his role as a potential investor, and as such, the limited disclosure did not destroy its trade secret status. The disclosure was never meant to enable a potential investor to compete directly against Ricochet, but instead, to work with them in an investment opportunity. Further, the court noted that Ricochet took proper means to protect its trade secret, by keeping it a secret from its employees, competitors, and the public. Next, the appellate court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Lamont and Carranco’s actions fell below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality, because they used improper means to locate the gas reservoir when they misused the map. Notably, Lamont and Carranco had never conducted any independent research, indicating their reliance on the map, which they used to enrich themselves off of Ricochet’s work and investment.

While Texas adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, it only took effect on September 1, 2013, and does not apply to prior misappropriation. As such, in the instant case, the appellate court relied heavily on the 3rd Restatement of Unfair Competition, which notably, is aligned with the Act. Therefore, this case is still persuasive in situations where a company must rely on common law to protect its trade secrets if it is in a state where the UTSA, or any version of the model Act, has not been adopted. Further, and more significantly, this case demonstrates that companies which did not employ confidentially or non-disclosure agreements, may still be protected in the scenario a potential business investor misuses their secrets. While certainly helpful in situations where negotiations could be stalled for such agreements, it is always better to employ these agreements, if for no other reason than it may define the scope of litigation.