Recent Decisions and Case Developments

InnoSys Inc. v. Amanda Mercer
August 28, 2015 | Supreme Court of the State of Utah
Utah Supreme Court Holds That Misapropriation Under the UTSA Gives Rise to a Rebuttable Presumption of Harm

On August 28, 2015, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the Utah trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant Amanda Mercer, holding that trade secret misappropriation under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm.

In InnoSys Inc. v. Amanda Mercer, plaintiff defense industry technology company sued its former engineer, defendant Amanda Mercer, for violating her non-disclosure agreement and misappropriating the company’s trade secrets, protected material under the UTSA. Mercer had forwarded confidential emails to her private email account and copied a confidential business plan to her own personal external storage device. Further, after InnoSys ended her employment and she was later denied unemployment benefits, she submitted these protected documents into the administrative record of her appeal before the Department of Workforce Services.

The Utah trial court granted Mercer’s summary judgment motion based on InnoSys’ failure to establish any actual or threatened harm. Additionally, the lower court entered rule 11 sanctions against Innosys and awarded Mercer attorney fees. The lower court’s reasoning stemmed in part from the fact that Mercer had apparently destroyed the confidential documents that she misappropriated, thereby defeating the potential for harm to InnoSys.

The state’s Supreme Court reversed the lower court and remanded for further proceedings, reviving InnoSys’ claims against Mercer. Because it was undisputed that Mercer misappropriated these protected documents, the sole issue on appeal concerned the evidence of harm. The Utah high court reasoned that the instant facts demonstrated a prima facie case of misappropriation under the UTSA and thus, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. Judge Lee instructed that “trade secrets are a right of property”1 and upon proof of misappropriation, the “trade secret claimant is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm for the purposes of injunctive relief . . . .”2 Judge Lee observed that such a principle is widely accepted under UTSA caselaw and is considered a core standard of trade secret law. Additionally, even though Mercer had apparently destroyed the protected documents at the center of the case, such actions were not sufficient to rebut the presumption of harm to InnoSys. Judge Lee noted that injunctive relief would yield little harm to Mercer if she did indeed destroy the documents, and would provide great protection to InnoSys if she did not, and had intentions to continue misappropriating the confidential information.

1 InnoSys Inc. v. Amanda Mercer, 2015 UT 80U, ¶33.
2 Id. at ¶34.

Lynx System Developers, Inc. v. Zebra Enterprise Solutions Corporation
August 20, 2015 | United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Zebra Enterprise Solutions Changes Venue and Files for Declaratory Judgment

On June 10, 2015, Lynx Systems Developers Inc. (“Lynx”) sued Zebra Enterprise Solutions Corp. (“Zebra”) in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for a number of claims including misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and fraud. The dispute between the two parties stemmed from a joint venture the parties engaged in to build a system that would track NFL football players’ actions in real time using hardware installed in players’ shoulder pads. The business relationship between the parties disintegrated and the parties then developed competing tracking systems independently. After Zebra won a contract with the NFL, Lynx brought the initial suit in Massachusetts District Court.

Last week, in response to the complaint, Zebra filed a motion to dismiss the suit in Massachusetts District Court and on August 20, 2015, brought a new complaint against Lynx in Santa Clara County Superior Court in Santa Clara, California. Zebra’s complaint pleads for declaratory relief of no (1) trade secret misappropriation, (2) breach of contract, (3) interference with existing and advantageous business relationships, (4) fraud, (5) breach of fiduciary duty, (6) unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts, (7) unjust enrichment, (8) conversion, and (9) intentional interference with prospective contractual and advantageous business and economic relationships. The California case is filed under docket number 115CV284620.

Spear Mktg., Inc. v. Bancorpsouth Bank
June 30, 2015 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit holds that Trade Secrets Fixed Within Software Fall within Copyrightable Subject Matter

On June 30, 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision which found Spear Marketing's (SMI) Texas Theft Liability Act and trade secret misappropriation claims precluded by the Copyright Act.

Spear Mktg., Inc. v. Bancorpsouth Bank involved a dispute over cash management software. SMI, producer of the software VaultWorks, alleged that its competitor, Argo, had stolen both technical and business trade secrets related to VaultWorks. On April 1, 2010, SMI had approached Argo to measure Argo's interest in acquiring SMI. In the pursuit of this deal, SMI provided a demonstration of its software and sent Argo screenshots of its software interface. The instant controversy arose when Argo launched its own cash management software at the end of 2011 and SMI's client, BancorpSouth Bank (BCS), had informed SMI that it had no intention of renewing its licensing contract with SMI.

An issue of first impression for the Fifth Circuit, the court confronted the intersection of trade secrets and the preemption purview of federal copyright law. Because processes and methods are excluded from copyright protection per section (102)(b) of the Copyright Act, SMI argued that their trade secrets fell outside the scope of the Act. Thus, the court was presented with whether processes and systems that had been fixed in a tangible medium of expression may be copyrightable subject matter for purposes of preemption, even though such matter may not be copyrightable matter generally.

The court addressed the issue by noting the current circuit split and followed the majority of its sister circuits,* holding that ideas fixed within tangible matter falls within the scope of copyright subject matter for preemption purposes, even if some of the underlying matter is not copyrightable. The court first stated that the Copyright Act protects computer software as a tangible medium. Then the court noted that the ideas that were allegedly stolen were fixed within the provided screenshots and the overall computer software. Therefore, SMI's trade secrets were fixed within the software, falling under the scope of the Copyright Act's preemption provision.



*The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits recognize that the Copyright Act's preemption provision, § 301(a), covers ideas fixed in tangible media. See Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424 (2d Cir. 2012); U.S. ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997); Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The Eleventh Circuit disagrees, finding that ideas are categorically excluded from copyright protection, even if the matter is fixed in a tangible medium. See Dunlap v. G&L Holding Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004).

Parrish v. Latham & Watkins
June 26, 2015 | Court of Appeal of California
California Supreme Court to Review Eligibility for Malicious Prosecution Claims

On October 14, the California Supreme Court agreed to review the Second District Appellate Court’s decision which held that the former employees of FLIR couldn’t sue FLIR’s former counsel, Latham & Watkins, for malicious prosecution because the trial court had denied the former employees’ summary judgment motion during the threatened trade secret misappropriation litigation.

In the underlying action, FLIR sued two of its former employees for threatened trade secret misappropriation because FLIR alleged a business plan that the two former employees authored and intended to carry to fruition could not be successful unless the former employees used trade secrets stolen from FLIR. FLIR was able to defeat the former employees’ summary judgment motion despite the former employees’ proof that they had submitted the same business plan to another company before working for FLIR. FLIR offered expert testimony at the summary judgment stage that purported to prove that no company other than FLIR had the technology necessary for the success of the former employees’ business plan. At trial, it was revealed that the expert opinions used to defeat the summary judgment motion were based on incomplete information and therefore could not prove that in order for the former employees’ business plan to be a success they would need to use trade secrets stolen from FLIR.

In addition to finding in favor of the former employees, the trial court also held that FLIR initiated and continued the action in bad faith and for anti-competitive motives. The former employees subsequently brought an action against Latham & Watkins for malicious prosecution, but Latham was able to defeat this claim by invoking California anti-SLAPP law. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed this decision in June. Commentators who advocate for malicious prosecution claims point out that lawyers should not be able to use litigation as an intimidation tactic to deter defendants from moving for summary judgment. If the California Supreme Court affirms the Second District’s decision, it can effectively give a “free pass to lawyers for any decisions made after clearing the summary-judgment hurdle.”

For more information on the history of this litigation see here and here.

CBS Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission
May 8, 2015 | United States Court of Appeals for the district of Columbia Circuit
FCC Can't Require Merger Applicants to Disclose Trade Secrets to Non-Parties

The D.C. Circuit’s decision in CBS indicates that federal courts acknowledge the critical implications of trade secret disclosure and trade secret law’s increasing significance in the protection of business practices. The D.C. Circuit held that it was improper for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to require merger applicants to submit proprietary documents for review and make them available for examination by industry participants not a party to the action, on an expedited basis.

Typically when reviewing cable company mergers, the FCC requires disclosure of information including key affiliate contracts and negotiation documents. Within the cable industry, these documents are kept highly confidential. The disclosure of these documents would expose not only the cable company parties involved in the merger, but also the content providers which they do business with. The Plaintiffs in this case, a group of content providers, utilized the Trade Secret Act to resist disclosure of their proprietary information to third party examiners. The Trade Secret Act prohibits disclosing sensitive business information unless “authorized by law.” The Plaintiffs successfully argued that this disclosure of sensitive business information was not authorized by the law because the Commission’s own regulations and internal policies did not authorize the disclosure which the FCC sought. The FCC’s internal policies provide that “a persuasive showing as to the reasons for inspection will be required [for disclosure]” and that the underlying documents must be “necessary” to the review process. The D.C. Circuit held that the affiliate contracts and negotiation documents were merely relevant, but not necessary to the FCC’s merger review. Thus, the required disclosure of proprietary documents involving third party content providers was not authorized by law and prohibited by the Trade Secrets Act.

E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Industries, Inc.
April 2, 2015 | 4th Circuit, United States District Court - Eastern District of Virginia
Kolon Pays $360 Million in Settlement to DuPont for Trade Secret Misappropriation

On April 30, 2015, Kolon Industries Inc. ("Kolon"), a South Korean company, agreed to pay $360 million to E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. ("DuPont") after a lengthy trade secrets dispute over Kevlar technology.

On September 21, 2009, DuPont sued Kolon in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Subsequently, Judge Robert Payne issued a spoilation-of-evidence order, adverse-inference jury instruction and attorneys fees for DuPont in response to Kolon's intentional destruction of evidence. In 2011, the jury awarded $919 to DuPont. In 2014, the Fourth Circuit overturned the jury verdict on the ground that Kolon was wrongly prevented from presenting trial evidence and assigned the case to a new judge.

Meanwhile, two former DuPont employees plead guilty to the involvement with the trade secret misappropriation in 2009 and 2014, and five former Kolon executives and employees where charged in 2012. Kolon finally started settlement talks with DuPont in light of the parallel jury trials in both civil and criminal courts.

Kolon pled guilty to conspiracy for stealing the Kevlar trade secrets. In turn, the company was sentenced to pay $85 million in criminal fines and $275 million in restitution damages in Eastern District of Virginia court. This was a land mark case for the U.S. Department of Justice as the first instance where a foreign corporation without direct presence in the United States was directly served with a U.S. criminal process based on an international treaty.

CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Robert Simms
March 25, 2015 | Eastern Division, Northern District of Illinois
Social Media Group Membership Lists May Be Trade Secrets

In CDM Media, the Defendant, former employee Robert Simms, was granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss the multiple claims filed in CDM’s complaint. CDM sued its former employee, Simms, for refusing to transfer control of a LinkedIn group allegedly owned by CDM and allegedly wrongfully retaining CDM’s confidential information after Simms left CDM and using it in competition with CDM. The court denied the motion with regard to one claim, but granted the motion regarding the remaining two claims.
CDM asserted Trade Secret protection under the Illinois Trade Secret Act over three separate aspects of CDM’s business. First, CDM asserts Trade Secret protection over a LinkedIn group called “the CIO Speaker Bureau,” a private online community of chief information officers and senior Information Technology executives interested in participating in or speaking at CDM events. Second, CDM asserts Trade Secret protection over the confidential information contained in this LinkedIn group. Lastly, CDM asserts Trade Secret protection over information from CDM’s Event Logistic Management database (“ELM”), which included CDM’s sensitive information including CDM vendor and customer lists, pricing and cost data regarding its products and services and profit or loss information. The court also denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on common law misappropriation.
The Northern District of Illinois denied the motion to dismiss, holding that there was a question of fact which a jury must decide regarding the Speaker Bureau membership list. The court denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss regarding the confidential information contained in the LinkedIn group, holding that “[w]hile a private communication can contain a trade secret, it is not itself a trade secret. It is therefore insufficient for plaintiff to allege that the LinkedIn group’s private communications were trade secrets under the Illinois Act.” The court also denied the motion to dismiss regarding the ELM database, holding that the Plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant actually used the data from the ELM database after he left CDM, and therefore this claim was not viable.
Moving forward, cases that involve business development though social media will continue to mold the landscape of trade secret jurisprudence. Here, the Nothern District of Illinois court is willing to extend trade secret protections to cover social media business development and holds the defendant to a high bar to have the claims dismissed. The court is willing to consider the confidential nature of communications via social media and recognizes that a jury can find that business development through social media may have required a significant investment of time and money. It will be interesting to see in the future how other states interpret its own trade secret statutes as it applies to social media.

Professional Investigating & Consulting Agency, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Company
March 23, 2015 | New Castle County Superior Court
Delaware Superior Court Denies Exemplary Damages

In this case during a twelve day trial, the jury found that Plaintiff, Professional Investigating & Consulting Agency, Inc.’s (“PICA”) Channel Management Program, was a trade secret and that Defendant, Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”) wilfully and maliciously misappropriated the Channel Management Proposal. On the Channel Management Proposal misappropriation claim, the jury awarded PICA $300,000 in damages for out of pocket expenses and lost profits as well $700,000 for HP’s unjust enrichment.

On March 23, 2015, the New Castle County Delaware Superior Court decided on the parties’ post-trial motions. The court granted in part and denied in part PICA’s motions for exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees, attorneys’ fees and expenses, and costs and interest. The court also denied HP’s motion for a new trial or remittitur and renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Regarding the trade secret misappropriation verdict, HP argued that PICA did not present evidence that it derived any economic value from the Channel Management Program not being generally well-known because “every aspect of PICA’s proposal was generally known”, and that PICA attempted to keep the program confidential. The court, however, applied Delaware’s Uniform Trade Secret Act (“DUSTA”) and found that PICA provided extensive evidence at trial that though some of the components of PICA’s program was a trade secret, the program as a whole was a trade secret and that the jury’s damage award was not duplicative.

The court also applied the DUSTA when it granted in part and denied in part PICA’s motion for exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees. Although PICA moved for the court to grant two million dollars in exemplary damages (the maximum amount allowed under the DUSTA), the court followed the guidance of Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Kirkland and denied exemplary damages. Agilent took the approach of making the plaintiff “whole and to deprive [the defendant] of unjust rewards.” The court here analogized this case to Agilent, where further punishment through exemplary damages were unnecessary because the court had already granted a “stringent remedy that [would] sufficiently vindicate the interests of [the plaintiff] and those more generally protected by the Delaware Uniform Trade Secrets Act.” In the current case, the court held that “the jury’s $1 million award reasonably compensates PICA for misappropriation of its trade secrets… [and] in light of the total jury verdict, the Court decline[d] to impose an additional amount for exemplary damages for punitive purposes.”
This case is significant because the court demonstrates that though the DUTSA permits a court to award exemplary damages in cases where wilful and malicious misappropriation exists, the bar for granting exemplary damages will be set high in cases where the total jury verdict already reasonably compensates the plaintiff for the misappropriation. Though the bar is set high for exemplary damages, this wasn’t much of a total loss for the plaintiff because the court granted the plaintiff’s requested 75% of attorneys’ fees for the entire litigation of the Channel Management Program misappropriation claim as well as 75% of attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by PICA since July 29, 2013 due to HP’s bad faith throughout the discovery process. Although PICA was not able to obtain exemplary damages, the court did grant PICA to recover for most of the costs incurred with the claims which it prevailed on.

Koninklijke Philips N.V., et al. v. Elec-tech international Co., Ltd.
March 20, 2015 | Northern District of California
Northern District of California Declines to Allow Plaintiffs to Use Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Allege Misappropriation

In this case, Plaintiff, Koninklijke Philips N.V. (“Philips”), et al. brought ten causes of action alleging that Dr. Chen, who was an employee of Plaintiff Lumileds Lighting Company, downloaded thousands of files “containing Philips Lumileds’ trade secrets and confidential business information onto a portable storage device." Complaint, ECF 1 ¶ 5. Dr. Chen then became employed by Defendant, Elec-Tech international Co., Ltd (“ETI”) and only six months into this employment, ETI announced two “new high-energy LED lighting products, an amount of time Plaintiffs claim is ‘unprecedented’ in the lighting industry.” Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Elec-Tech International Co., Ltd., no. 14-cv-12737-BLF, 2015 WL 1289984 at *1 (N.D. Ca. March 30, 2015). The Plaintiffs used one claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) to bring the other nine state claims. The court here held that the Plaintiffs did not state a CFAA claim upon which relief can be granted and therefore dismissed the nine state law based trade secret claims as well as the CFAA claim.

The Plaintiffs in this case were creative in finding a way to try to get their Trade Secret claims into federal court. However, the court took a strict stand against using the CFAA for misappropriation purposes. The court pointed out that the CFAA is interpreted by courts as “an anti-hacking statute.” Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Elec-Tech International Co., Ltd., no. 14-cv-12737-BLF, 2015 WL 1289984 at *3 (N.D. Ca. March 30, 2015) (citing United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir.2012)). Additionally, in the past, the Ninth Circuit has expressly refused to expand this statute to cover misappropriation. Id. While this is a blow for Philips here, this does help the argument for federal trade secret legislation. If courts are going to hold the bar this high for federal statutes that could be expanded to include misappropriation, then federal trade secret legislation is necessary in order to afford trade secret protection by the federal courts as well as state courts.

Thomas A. Lamont, L.O.G. Energy Development, Ltd., Rosendo A. Carranco and Montecristo Energy II, Ltd. V. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno, Ltd., LLP And Job Energy Partners II, Ltd.
March 13, 2015 | Supreme Court of Texas
"Treasure Map" Misappropriation Award Upheld in Texas

On March 13, 2015, the Texas Supreme Court denied review of Lamont et al v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno, Ltd. et al, thereby upholding a $4.9 million jury award for Vaquillas in its trade secret misappropriation suit. At the center of the dispute is the seismic map of oil and gas prospects that Ricochet Energy, Inc. generated pursuant to an agreement with Vaquillas in 2003 and 2004. The seismic map, or “treasure map” as both parties had referred to it, had identified a lucrative prospect – a gas reservoir containing natural gas estimated as much as $60 million.

The instant controversy began when Thomas Lamont, a co-owner of Ricochet, separated from Ricochet in 2006, and then formed a new entity, Montecristo II, with another oil and gas investor, Rosendo Carranco in 2007. Because Lamont had continued to own a working interest in the gas prospect, after Lamont’s separation, Ricochet shared the treasure map with Lamont as a potential investor, without signing any confidentiality agreements. Montecristo II then outbid Ricochet to lease property adjacent to the gas reservoir, and depleted it, foreclosing any opportunity for Ricochet to withdraw any gas.

On appeal from the jury’s verdict in favor of Vaquillas, Lamont argued that the trade secret’s status was destroyed when Ricochet shared the treasure map with Lamont after his effective resignation date. However, the court noted that the disclosure to Lamont was in his role as a potential investor, and as such, the limited disclosure did not destroy its trade secret status. The disclosure was never meant to enable a potential investor to compete directly against Ricochet, but instead, to work with them in an investment opportunity. Further, the court noted that Ricochet took proper means to protect its trade secret, by keeping it a secret from its employees, competitors, and the public. Next, the appellate court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Lamont and Carranco’s actions fell below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality, because they used improper means to locate the gas reservoir when they misused the map. Notably, Lamont and Carranco had never conducted any independent research, indicating their reliance on the map, which they used to enrich themselves off of Ricochet’s work and investment.

While Texas adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, it only took effect on September 1, 2013, and does not apply to prior misappropriation. As such, in the instant case, the appellate court relied heavily on the 3rd Restatement of Unfair Competition, which notably, is aligned with the Act. Therefore, this case is still persuasive in situations where a company must rely on common law to protect its trade secrets if it is in a state where the UTSA, or any version of the model Act, has not been adopted. Further, and more significantly, this case demonstrates that companies which did not employ confidentially or non-disclosure agreements, may still be protected in the scenario a potential business investor misuses their secrets. While certainly helpful in situations where negotiations could be stalled for such agreements, it is always better to employ these agreements, if for no other reason than it may define the scope of litigation.